

Suicide Bombings in Urban Warfare: Trends in Motives and Targets

By
Justin Walker

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Urban Warfare Analysis Center

Shawnee, OK

(405) 273-3035


Summary

Suicide Bombing is a difficult tactic to guard against in an urban environment.* Suicide attacks have increased worldwide since 2003; 83 percent of the suicide bombings since 1981 have occurred in just the last four years. The motives behind suicide attacks originated in Lebanon as a campaign to expel foreign occupiers. Over the years, other groups used the Koran to justify suicide bombing as a path to heaven. The targets also have changed from military personnel to attacks against both military and civilian targets. Suicide attacks, once aimed primarily at foreigners and practitioners of a different religion, have now expanded to co-religionists of the bomber. More attacks are likely in the future, given the spread of jihadist websites and the lack of effective countermeasures.

I. Increase in Suicide Bombings Worldwide Since 2003

Suicide bombing is a tactic of urban warfare that has increased steadily in the past 25 years. Since 2003, however, suicide bombing has spiked dramatically, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. See Figure 1 for an outline of the trend in suicide attacks over the past decade. The year 2007 is projected to have close to 600 suicide bombings worldwide.

Figure 1 - Suicide Bombings Trend, 1998-2007¹



* This report is the first in a series addressing different aspects of suicide bombings in urban warfare.

Suicide Bombing is a high reward, low risk, low cost tactic.² Suicide bombings kill more civilians on average than any other method of terror attack, including IEDs. Suicide attacks kill on average twelve people per attack, whereas conventional terrorist attacks kill one person per attack.³ However, suicide attacks are not as effective against military personnel; an attack against military targets averages less than one fatality.⁴

The ease of this living “smart bomb” enhances its effectiveness. Attack sponsors need not plan an escape, nor do they risk a captured assailant disseminating vital information to police and military authorities.⁵ The cost of a car (often stolen), explosives, and an inexperienced fighter, whose skill is his own death, is small compared to training and providing resources for a paramilitary fighter in a lengthy guerilla campaign. Suicide bombs in Palestine cost less than \$150, according to one estimate.⁶

II. Most Attackers Motivated by Jihad

To Islamic radicals, *jihad* is the primary motivation for suicide bombings. Jihad literally means to strive or to exert oneself, particularly against those who attack Islam.⁷ Traditionally, Islamic judges have permitted Islamic warriors to kill other Muslims if it led to victory against unbelievers.⁸ Contemporary radical Islamic commentators have built on this ruling to rationalize the use of suicide bombings, otherwise known as “martyrdom operations.” Not only are martyrdom operations permissible for Islamic radicals, but suicide bombers are more highly esteemed than those killed by other means.⁹

Moreover, Islamic terrorist networks emphasize the benefits of martyrdom, attracting additional recruits. Al Qaeda in Iraq released posthumous videos of the “marriage ceremonies” between the suicide bomber and his heavenly harem.¹⁰ Bombing sponsors describe foreign suicide bombers as impatient martyrs, pining for the rewards of jihad immediately.¹¹

How Islamic Radicals Use the Koran and the Hadiths to Justify Suicide Bombings

The rewards for martyrdom according to the Koran and the oral traditions of the prophet Mohammed include immediate eternal paradise, the intercession for 70 family members, and the *houris*, a harem of 72 black-eyed virgins.¹² For example, the Koran states:

- 2:216 - Fighting is commanded upon you even though it is disagreeable to you.
- 4:74 - So let those fight in the way of Allah who sell this world’s life for the Hereafter. And whoever fights in the way of Allah, be he slain or be he victorious, We shall grant him a mighty reward.
- 9:111 – Surely Allah has bought from the believers their persons and their property – theirs (in return) is the Garden. They fight in Allah’s way, so they slay and are slain.
- 56:36-37 - So we have made them virgins, loving, equals in age.

Suicide bombing is a relatively safe tactic within the aforementioned religious boundaries. Jihadists are determinists; they believe that Allah's will is expressed in success and failure.¹³ If the attacker is confident that his act will guarantee his personal salvation, any suicide attack in the name of jihad becomes inherently successful. Instead of being an extreme tactic, a suicide bomb is considered a conservative one within this worldview. The only way an attack fails is if no infidels are killed.

Sponsors of Suicide Bombings Have Political Objectives

A suicide bomber is not a lone warrior; suicide bombings occur within the context of a larger organization and its goals. A suicide attack usually has a sponsor—often a larger organization like Al Qaeda or Hamas—and handlers, which is the subgroup that prepares the attack. Some researchers believe that suicide bombing is the result of occupation, not religion; suicide bombing is used to coerce democratic governments to withdraw their troops from lands perceived to be the homelands of the insurgent forces.¹⁴ The majority of suicide bombing campaigns in history can be perceived in this secular context—Lebanon, Israel (Palestine), Turkey (Kurdistan), Russia (Chechnya), Sri Lanka (Tamil), and currently Iraq and Afghanistan. Although 31 out of 35 insurgent groups that have executed suicide bombings are Islamic, a religious mindset may overshadow secular objectives of the supporting organizations.¹⁵

III. Variations by Group and Region

Hezbollah and Iran: The Start of the Modern Era of Suicide Bombing

Hezbollah and its proto-organization Islamic Jihad initiated the suicide terror campaign in Lebanon in the early 1980s. The Ayatollah Khomeini sent 1,000 troops of the Iranian Revolutionary guard to Lebanon to establish a base to export the Islamic Revolution.¹⁶ Subsequently, the first suicide bombing of the modern era occurred in 1981, when the Iranian-supported Shiite group al-Dawa detonated a car bomb at the Iraqi Embassy, causing 61 fatalities.¹⁷ After the Israeli incursion into Lebanon in 1982, Iranian-influenced Shiite groups coalesced into Hezbollah. Its first suicide attack occurred on 11 November 1982, when a suicide truck bomb detonated outside the Israeli army headquarters in Tyre.¹⁸ In 1983, Hezbollah stepped up its attacks against Western targets.

- In April 1983, suicide bombs against the American embassy in Beirut killed 63 civilians.
- In October 1983, suicide bombs against the American Marine barracks and French Military living quarters killed 300 soldiers and civilians.
- The synchronization of the October attacks would become a tactic emulated by Al Qaeda.¹⁹



Attending the wounded at the US Marine Barracks in Lebanon
October 1983 (Bill Foley, AP)

Hezbollah did not embrace suicide terrorism until after it had developed a theological justification for the tactic. The Ayatollah Sayyid Mohammed Fadlallah was the Shiite theologian who set the ground rules for the Islamic use of suicide bombings. He claimed the threat to Islam required an extraordinary response.²⁰

- Fadlallah asserted that there was no difference between being killed in combat with a gun in one's hand and being killed by a bomb strapped to the waist.²¹
- Interestingly, he did not emphasize paradise as the reward for the martyr; the reward was the advancement of the living cause.²² He insisted that suicide operations were only valid if the attacks brought about military and political change.²³

Although Hezbollah developed religious justification for the act, Hezbollah's use of suicide bombers was politically motivated and pragmatic. The goal was not a heavenly-rewarded martyrdom for the bomber, but instead an identifiable objective that could suffer a "diminishing return" from overuse of the tactic.²⁴

- Hezbollah was sensitive to casualties, so self sacrifice had to be measured by the opportunity costs involved.²⁵
- The suicide bombers in Lebanon were not all devout Muslims. Of 41 known suicide attackers during the Lebanese conflict, 27 were from socialist or communist parties, three were Christian, and only eight were Islamic radicals.²⁶

Hezbollah moved away from suicide terrorism, which suggests some organizations will refrain from the tactic once certain objectives are met. In the 1980s, Hezbollah performed over 25 suicide attacks. Out of 1500 Hezbollah terrorist operations in the 1990s, the organization only performed 2 suicide bombings.²⁷ By the end of the decade, Hezbollah no longer had a suicide training program.²⁸

Hezbollah's attacks against coalition forces inspired other insurgent groups to perform suicide bombings in their respective campaigns. In 1987, the Tamil Tigers performed its first suicide attack against the Sri Lankan military. The leader of the Tamil Tigers Vellupai Prabhakaran claims to have been inspired by Hezbollah.²⁹ Osama Bin Laden references the Beirut suicide bombings as a watershed breakthrough in the fight against the "infidel" West.³⁰



Assassination of Indian Prime Minister Gandhi in 1991.

Photo of Tamil Tiger suicide bomber taken seconds before the attack. Dhanu, the woman in green facing Gandhi, has an explosive belt beneath her robe. (Asia Tribune)

Hamas: Intensification of Religion and Rationalization of Civilian Targets

As Shiite-executed bombings began to wane after the Israeli pullout from central Lebanon in 1985, Sunni Muslims in Palestine adopted the tactic. In the early 1990s, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin expelled 415 Islamic militants from the West Bank to Lebanon. These radicals met with Hezbollah, which then trained Sunni radicals in the methods of suicide terrorism.³¹ In April 1993, Hamas performed its first attack when a suicide car bomb detonated between two buses.³² In the midst of the terror campaign, Hamas performed 24 suicide bombings in the 1990s and 51 suicide attacks since the second intifada began in 2000.³³

Hamas shifted the trend from military targets in Lebanon to citizens (or "rationalized" military targets), a transition that widened the number of available targets. Hamas and its Islamic scholars defended the transition of targets in several ways:

- In a democracy, the electorate is responsible for the decisions made by those in power, and the electorate pays the taxes that support military actions.
- Mohammed used catapults to hurl rocks over the walls of cities, and these rocks likely killed unarmed civilians.
- In the case of Muslims killed in the midst of suicide attacks, those Muslims that live among infidels or work in their interest are apostates worthy of death.³⁴

Suicide terrorism underwent *Islamification* under the input of Hamas and its spiritual leader Sheik Yassin (1987-2004), and the “martyr” soon became a cultural and religious icon. Hamas would only recruit bombers who understood the religious context of the martyrdom operation; many had large sections of the Koran memorized.³⁵ The rewards of martyrdom played prominently in suicide bombing culture and recruitment. A study of Hamas suicide bombing recruiters revealed that the greatest recruiting factors were religion, individual frustration, and personal economic goals (such as family support after the suicide attack).³⁶

- Martyrdom became a cultural trend in Palestine, and suicide bombers were idolized like rock stars.
- In Jenin, the walls of hospital waiting rooms were covered with posters and pictures celebrating the Palestinian “martyrs.”³⁷



Schoolgirls in Jenin honoring the first female Palestinian suicide bomber in 2004
(Al-Ayyan, 1 February 2006)

Al Qaeda: Attacking Infidels and Heretics Alike

Al Qaeda exported suicide bombing from the Israeli conflict to the larger conflict with the West. Suicide terrorism became the public spectacle that advanced the goals of the Salafist movement, and any Western symbol became a fair target. Al Qaeda advisor Yusuf al-Ayyiri expanded the alleged legal justification for suicide terrorism to the Islamic conflict worldwide, especially Chechnya.³⁸ Al Qaeda supported the cause in Chechnya, and the first Chechen suicide attack occurred in 2000. Within 2 years, Chechens began to target Russian civilians with suicide bombings.³⁹ The attacks in New York and Washington, DC on September 11, 2001 were the

culmination of the neo-Salafist view of targets, as Al Qaeda perceived the United States as an occupier of Arabia and the symbol of corrupt Western influence over the House of Islam.⁴⁰

The Goal of the Salafist Movement

Salafism is the attempt to emulate the activities and structure of the early Islamic community under Mohammed. The goal of the movement is to unite mosque and state under one central government (the neo-Caliphate) that rules over the former Islamic empire. Democracy, therefore, is heresy.⁴¹ Expelling the United States from the Islamic world and ensuring the failure of Iraqi democracy are key goals for the Salafist jihadist. Concepts such as liberty and individual freedom have no role in Salafism. Thus, attempts to persuade Muslims away from the Salafist mindset require an emphasis on justice and not Western conceits.⁴²

- A failed state in Iraq—created by defeating the Iraqi security apparatus and instigating a civil war between Shiites and Sunnis—enhances Al Qaeda’s efforts to create a neo-Taliban state in the heart of the Arab world that would support and export Salafist jihad.⁴³

Iraq: Evolution of Targets away from Coalition Forces

Suicide bombers in Iraq have largely followed the tactics of Hamas instead of Hezbollah, as military forces no longer bear the brunt of suicide attacks. In 2003, all suicide attacks came against coalition forces. In 2006, only 10 percent of suicide attacks targeted coalition forces, with 50 percent against Iraqi security forces and 40 percent against Shiite targets.⁴⁴ Adjustments made by coalition forces to counter suicide attacks contributed to the reduction of suicide bombs against military personnel, but countermeasures do not explain why Islamic groups transitioned to soft targets instead of abandoning the tactic.

As the target of suicide bombings changed in Iraq, so has the nature of the attackers. The majority of suicide bombers operating in Iraq are foreigners, and many of them are wealthy Saudis and Kuwaitis that were smuggled into Iraq via Syria.⁴⁵ In this context, suicide terrorism is not the last resort. For the foreign jihadists, it is the opportunity to enter heaven quickly by killing heretics and infidels. For the Salafist sponsors, it is a renewable source of “smart bomb” delivery systems to disrupt civil reconstruction.⁴⁶

- Only 10 percent of the suicide bombers in Iraq are Iraqis.⁴⁷
- Nearly 45 percent of all foreign militants fighting in Iraq are Saudis, and half of all Saudis that enter Iraq do so to become a suicide bomber.⁴⁸



**Martyr Video by Saudi who Later Performed Suicide Attack in Iraq
(Memri)**

Bin Laden had insisted on a conciliatory approach to handling Shiite and Sunni conflict, yet Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) made Shiites the key target in suicide operations. Bin Laden argued that Islamist groups should ignore theological differences and unite to battle the West; as a result, Al Qaeda met with Hezbollah, contacted Iran, and abstained from killing Shiites.⁴⁹ AQI leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, however, rejected this intra-Islamic diplomacy and intentionally targeted Iraqi Shiites to foment civil war and lay the groundwork for a neo-Caliphate from the rubble of Iraq.⁵⁰

- Zarqawi's change in bombing targets led to a devastating barrage of attacks against Shiite mosques and markets. This tactic outlived Zarqawi's death in 2006 and has continued into 2007.⁵¹
- Sunnis that aid the new Iraqi government are also targets; doctrinal allegiance is no longer a barrier to becoming an Al Qaeda target.⁵²

The Taliban: Poor Job Imitating Iraqi Insurgents

Suicide bombing, foreign to traditional Afghan warfare, is on the rise in Afghanistan.⁵³ The Taliban's suicide campaign against coalition forces began in 2004, with two bombings that year and a projected 114 bombings through the end of 2007 (see Graph 1).

- There is evidence that Iraqi insurgents have shared tactics with the Taliban, which may explain the increase in suicide bombings in Afghanistan.⁵⁴
- In November 2007, Italian police discovered a cell in Italy that recruited and assisted suicide bombers in Iraq and Afghanistan, which suggests a transnational network that funnels human bombs to both war fronts.⁵⁵

Nonetheless, the kill ratio of the Taliban-led suicide bombings is miniscule compared to the synchronized attacks of the Iraqi insurgents.⁵⁶ The reason for this discrepancy between the intended targets and the subsequent victim total suggests inefficacy on the part of the Taliban's suicide bombing campaign.

- Forty-three percent of the Afghanistan attacks in 2006-2007 thus far have killed only the bomber.⁵⁷
- It takes a modicum of skill to perform suicide bombings in urban environments. Many of the Taliban attackers were drugged, deranged, children, or poor villagers who were unable to attack difficult targets like fast moving military convoys in urban environments.⁵⁸

The Taliban continues to target coalition forces instead of soft targets in the bombing campaign, with little success. Afghan civilians were targets in only 8 out of the nearly 200 suicide bombings since 2001.⁵⁹ Arab Al Qaeda bombers have been responsible for the major attacks against Afghan civilians.⁶⁰

- Despite the Taliban mostly targeting coalition forces, Afghan civilians have borne 84 percent of the suicide bombing casualties.⁶¹ The slaughter of civilians has contributed to a drop in local support for the Taliban insurgency, and Taliban leaders have publicly apologized for the death of civilians.⁶²

Secular Organizations and Suicide Bombings

Secular organizations that have practiced suicide terrorism in the modern era share a similar ideological framework with Islamic organizations. The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka (which claims to have performed 322 suicide bombings since 1987),⁶³ the Kurdistan Workers' party in Turkey, and pro-Syrian groups in Lebanon were influenced heavily by revolutionary utopianism. Both Marxist-Leninism and Salafism have a "top-down" approach to human organization, as individuals in society are subject to the command of the revolutionary party or the Islamist Caliphate. Thus, totalitarianism is the common ideological ground between most secular and religious groups that employ suicide bombers.

IV. Outlook: More Attacks Likely in the Future

The upward trend of suicide bombings probably will continue for the next couple of years. The effectiveness of most attacks combined with the low cost of recruiting and equipping bombers will continue to appeal to insurgents worldwide. In addition, there are still few good countermeasures to prevent suicide bombers from mixing in crowded urban environments.

A) Triggers that Could Increase the Number of Suicide Bombings in the Future

The current rise of suicide bombings may be connected to the growth of jihadist websites that offer tactical guidance and glorify martyrdom. As the jihadist message spreads and more Muslims in third world countries gain access to the Internet, so too will the pool of potential suicide bombers.

- Jihadist propaganda sites grew from 14 in 2000 to more than 4000 in 2005.⁶⁴
- Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda continue to exploit the Internet; users are able to order CDs, DVDs, and other media that promote the Salafist agenda.⁶⁵
- The Taliban banned television while in power, but now use the Internet to promote jihad.⁶⁶

Shiite groups also may return to suicide bombing in the future, which would dramatically increase the number of attacks worldwide. Sunnis have been responsible for the current spike in attacks, whereas Shiites in Iraq and Pakistan have abstained from using the tactic against Sunnis and US interests.⁶⁷ The only Shiite suicide bombing of the Iraq war occurred in July 2007 when a car bomb detonated outside a Sunni mosque.⁶⁸ If this is the start of a Shiite-bombing trend, the sectarian civil war will enter a deadlier phase as Shiites and Sunnis use suicide attacks against each other.

Other events that could lead to an increase in suicide bombings include:

- Assassination of Iraqi Shiite cleric Ali Sistani. Grand Ayatollah Sistani has been the voice of peace in Iraq since 2003. He has urged Iraqi Shiites not to retaliate against Sunni neighbors in face of Sunni-executed suicide attacks. If Sistani is assassinated, he could be replaced by a more radical Shiite cleric bent on revenge. Suicide bombings would be an easy way to exact that revenge.
- Lack of restraint by suicide bombing organizations. Many groups that use suicide bombers fear backlash from local populations and thus use attacks with caution. In recent years, however, Chechen suicide bombers held a school hostage in Beslan and the Taliban has recruited and kidnapped children to detonate suicide bombs.⁶⁹ The continuation of such activities would lead to even more suicide attacks.
- Improving Iraqi economy. Ironically, an improving Iraqi economy would likely mean additional funds to pay for suicide bombings. Militants use mafia-style tactics to siphon money out of the legal Iraqi economy.⁷⁰

B) Triggers that Could Reduce the Number of Suicide Bombings in the Future

Insurgencies that turn on the people lose support, which could inspire some groups to calculate that the benefits of suicide attacks no longer outweigh the costs. A RAND study of 91 post-WWII insurgencies illustrates that groups fail when they commit mass killings of civilians.⁷¹ Suicide attacks in recent years have increasingly targeted civilians, but the bombings may reach a saturation point that alienates local populations and prompts citizens to turn against insurgents.

- The saturation point may have been reached already in parts of Iraq. Sunni tribal militias that have fought coalition forces are now cooperating with US forces to push back against Al Qaeda.

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- The number of Al Qaeda-sponsored suicide bombings has dropped from 60 in January to 30 per month since June.⁷² By years end, we may see a change in the baseline projection (shown in Graph 1) as new data arrives.

The securing of the Syrian-Iraqi border and the shutting down of transnational human bomb smuggling networks would also likely reduce the number of suicide bombings in Iraq. Islamic insurgencies would need to find other ways to smuggle Saudis and Sunnis into the country, or they would need to rely on Iraqis to execute suicide attacks. Iraqis are responsible for only about ten percent of suicide bombings in Iraq.

The discrediting of radical leaders (such as the death or capture of Bin Laden and Zawahiri) or the defeat of their goals could demoralize the Islamic groups that are inspired by their rhetoric and vision, thus further weakening the justification for suicide bombings. Since Arab-Islamic psychology is heavily influenced by determinism, radical jihadists may perceive the failure of global leaders to advance the cause of jihad through suicide attacks as Allah's disapproval of the tactic. In short, success vindicates the tactic, while failure shames it.

Other factors that could reduce the number of suicide attacks worldwide include:

- Cessation of hostilities in current hot spots such as Israel, Sri Lanka, and Chechnya. This would not only reduce suicide attacks within those zones, but also reduce hostilities against Western targets.
- Iraqi security forces improve in their ability to protect and guard Shiite mosques and marketplaces from suicide attacks.
- Coalition forces continue to develop trustworthy intelligence on attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, thus preventing more bombings before they occur.

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End Notes

- ¹ Data Compiled from Suicide Terrorism (98-2003) and Worldwide Incident Tracking System (2004-2007). Figures for 2007 are estimates based on mid-year data from the Worldwide Incident Tracking System.
- ² Ayman Al-Zawahiri describes suicide bombings as the “most successful in inflicting damage on the opponent and the least costly in terms of casualties among the Mujahideen.” See “Part 11 of New Book by Egyptian Islamic Jihad Leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri.” Open Source Center. December 12, 2001. GMP2001121200008.
- ³ Hafez, Mohammed M. *Suicide Bombers in Iraq the Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007. 9
- ⁴ Cook, David, and Olivia Allison. *Understanding and Addressing Suicide Attacks The Faith and Politics of Martyrdom Operations*. Westport, Conn: Praeger Security International, 2007. 77
- ⁵ Hezbollah was aware of this benefit. See Helmer, Captain David. “Hezbollah’s Employment of Suicide Bombing during the 1980s: The Theological, Political, and Operational Development of a New Tactic.” *Military Review*. July-August 2006. <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug06/Helmer.pdf>
- ⁶ Hoffman, Bruce. “The Logic of Suicide Bombing.” *The Atlantic*. June 2003. <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200306/hoffman>
- ⁷ Firestone, Reuven. *Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 16.
- ⁸ Hafez, *Suicide Bombers in Iraq* 133
- ⁹ “The Islamic Ruling on the Permissibility of Martyrdom Operations.” http://www.cdfc.org/martyrdom_operations.htm
- ¹⁰ Cook *Understanding and Addressing...79*
- ¹¹ Ghosh, Aparisim. “Professor of Death.” *Time*. October 24th, 2005.
- ¹² Hafez, Mohammed M. *Manufacturing Human Bombs The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers*. Perspectives series. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006. 38.
- ¹³ Jenkins, Brian Michael. “Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Knowing Ourselves.” *Rand Corporation*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006. 81.
- ¹⁴ Pape, Robert Anthony. *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. New York: Random House, 2005. 4. Pape demonstrates that the Tamil Tigers, a Marxist insurgent group, was responsible for a plurality of the suicide bombings prior to the Iraq War in 2003. He also points out that 95 percent of suicide campaigns are connected to an overall political campaign. For a contrary opinion see Martin Kramer “Suicide Terrorism: Origins and Response” <http://www.geocities.com/martinkramerorg/PapeKramer.htm>
- ¹⁵ Eggen, Dan and Scott Wilson. “Suicide Bombs Potent Tools of Terrorists; Deadly Attacks Have Been Increasing and Spreading Since Sept. 11, 2001.” *The Washington Post*. A Section A01. July 17th, 2005.
- ¹⁶ Reuter, Christoph. *My life is a weapon a modern history of suicide bombing*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. 57.
- ¹⁷ See “Army for the Liberation of Kurdistan” <http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=4502>
- ¹⁸ Kramer, Martin. “Sacrifice and ‘Self Martyrdom’ in Shi’ite Lebanon.” <http://www.geocities.com/martinkramerorg/Sacrifice.htm>
- ¹⁹ Qunaratna, Rohan. *Inside Al Qaeda Global Network of Terror*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002. 147.
- ²⁰ Helmer, Daniel. “Hezbollah’s Employment of Suicide Bombing during the 1980s: The Theological, Political, and Operational Development of a New Tactic.” *Military Review*. July/August 2006. <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug06/Helmer.pdf>
- ²¹ Kramer, Martin. “The Moral Logic of Hezbollah” From *Origins of Terrorism*. <http://www.geocities.com/martinkramerorg/MoralLogic.htm>
- ²² In this case, bringing about self-rule in Lebanon and expelling the foreign forces. Kramer “The Moral Logic of Hezbollah”
- ²³ Pape *Dying to Win* 31.
- ²⁴ Helmer, Daniel. “Hezbollah’s Employment...”
- ²⁵ Shay, Shaul. “Suicide Terrorism in Lebanon.” *Countering Suicide Terrorism An International Conference: February 20-23, 2000, Herzliya, Israel*. Herzliya, Israel: International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, 2001. 89-92. 89.
- ²⁶ Pape *Dying to Win* 205. In the mid-80s, secular organizations such as the Syrian National Party, the Lebanese Communist Party, and the Socialist Nasserite Party launched suicide operations against Israeli forces in Lebanon (See Shay “Suicide Terrorism in Lebanon” 90).
- ²⁷ Reuter 66
- ²⁸ Pedahzur, Ami. *Suicide Terrorism*. Cambridge: Polity, 2005. 172
- ²⁹ Cronin, Audrey Kurth. “Terrorists and Suicide Attacks.” CRS. August 28, 2003. RL32058. CR- 5.
- ³⁰ “Bin Laden’s Sermon for the Feast of the Sacrifice.” *Middle East Media Research Institute*. Special Dispatch Series – No. 476. March 5, 2003.
- ³¹ Hafez *Manufacturing Human Bombs* 18
- ³² Hassan, Nasra. “An Arsenal of Believers” *The New Yorker*. November 19th, 2001.
- ³³ See Hassan, “An Arsenal of Believers”, and Urquhart, Conal “ Hamas in Call to End Suicide Bombings” *The Observer*. April 9, 2006.
- ³⁴ Cook *Understanding and Addressing... 55-56*
- ³⁵ Hassan, “An Arsenal of Believers”. See also “Mind of the Suicide Bomber.” May 25, 2003. CBS News. <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/05/23/60minutes/printable555344.shtml>
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- ³⁷ Pedahzur, Ami. “Explaining Suicide Terrorism.” <http://dev.laits.utexas.edu/movabletype/blogs/tiger/pedahzur-perliger-bialsky-2007.pdf>. Page 6.
- ³⁸ “The Islamic Ruling on the Permissibility of Martyrdom Operations.” http://www.cdfc.org/martyrdom_operations.htm

³⁹ Cook *Understanding and Addressing...* 41

⁴⁰ Many analysts credit Ayman al-Zawahiri for being the ideological branch of Al Qaeda. See Sageman, Marc. *Understanding Terror Networks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.

⁴¹ Gerges, Fawaz A. "Zarqawi and the D-Word: Is Democracy Un-Islamic?" *The Washington Post*. Jan 30, 2005; Page B01. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A46419-2005Jan29.html>. For a summary of Salafism and the origins of Al Qaeda's worldview, see Sageman *Understanding Terror Networks* pgs 1-15.

⁴² Gompert, David. "Heads We Win: The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency." Santa Monica, CA; RAND Corporation, 2007. 23

⁴³ Hafez *Suicide Bombers in Iraq* 83. See 73 and 77 for summary as to Al Qaeda's goal for Iraq. Also personal interview with March Burch, MI Officer (Ret.). Nov 7, 2007.

⁴⁴ Hafez, *Suicide Bombers in Iraq*, 92 and 104

⁴⁵ Hafez, *Suicide Bombers in Iraq*, 178

⁴⁶ See Caan, Christian "Journey of Death: Suicide Bombers in Iraq." *United States Institute of Peace*. July 2007.

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⁴⁸ Parker, "Saudis Role in Iraq..."

⁴⁹ Qunaratna 12, 147

⁵⁰ Intercepted Al Qaeda in Iraq document summarized in Hafez *Suicide Bombers in Iraq* 75.

⁵¹ See Smith, Dough and Louise Roug. "130 Killed in Iraq bombings" *Chicago Tribune*. January 6, 2006. "Four Suicide Bombers behind Last Week's Mosque Attack." *Associated Press Worldstream*. April 14, 2006. "Some of the deadliest attacks in Iraq." *Associated Press*. August 14th, 2007. Reid, Robert H. "Suicide Bomber Strikes Iraqi Funeral, Kills Mourner." *Associated Press Worldstream*. May 1st, 2007.

⁵² See Juhi, Bushra. "Bombings Strike Towns in Northern Iraq; Sunni Tribal Leader's House." *Associated Press*. Sept 26, 2007. And "Suicide Car Bomber Strikes Police Convoy near Market in Kirkuk, Iraq." *Associated Press*. October 11, 2007.

⁵³ Grassi, Ricardo. "Afghanistan: Taliban Shifts Gears with Suicide Bombers." *Interpress Service*. Oct 4, 2006. The first suicide attack in Afghanistan occurred September 9th, 2001, against the Northern Alliance leader Shah Massoud. Afghan fighters did not use suicide attacks against the Soviet invaders, even though the Afghan-Soviet war was fought the same time that Hezbollah used suicide attacks against Western forces in Lebanon.

⁵⁴ Williams, Brian Glyn and Cathy Young. "Cheney Attack Reveals Taliban Suicide Bombing Patterns." *Jamestown Foundation*. Terrorism Monitor. Vol 5, Issue 4; March 1, 2007. <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370264>

⁵⁵ "Italy Terrorist Raids 'Target 20'". BBCNews. Nov. 6th, 2007. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/europe/7080388.stm>

⁵⁶ Williams, Brian Glyn. "The Taliban Fedayeen: The World's Worst Suicide Bombers?" *The Jamestown Foundation*. Terrorism Monitor. Vol 5, Issue 14. July 19th, 2007. http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/TM_005_014.pdf

⁵⁷ Williams, Brian Glyn. "The Taliban Fedayeen..." In the spring of 2006, 72 percent of the attacks killed only the bomber.

⁵⁸ Williams, Brian Glyn. "The Taliban Fedayeen..."

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Motlagh, Jason. "Analysis: Taliban Upgrades Jihad Strategy." *United Press Institute*. Sept 26th, 2006.

⁶² "Taliban leaders Distance Themselves from Suicide Attacks." *Belleville Intelligencer*. Aug 26th, 2006. Page B7.

⁶³ "Tamil Tigers Admit Using 61 Suicide Bombers in Last One Year" BBC Monitoring International Reports, July 5, 2007.

⁶⁴ Cook *Understanding and Addressing...*102

⁶⁵ Ibid. 102.

⁶⁶ Motlagh, Jason. "Analysis: Taliban Upgrades Jihad Strategy."

⁶⁷ Cook *Understanding and Addressing...*26. Since 1996, no Shiite has detonated a suicide bomb against US interests. In fact, Hezbollah abandoned its suicide training program in 1996 (See Pedazhur *Suicide Terrorism* – 72). The last Shiite suicide attack against US interests was the Khobar Towers bombing in 1996 sponsored by Al Qaeda (See Sageman 45).

⁶⁸ From the World Incident Tracking System ICN 200707767. See: <http://wits.nctc.gov/ViewIncident.do?incidentId=50015>

⁶⁹ "Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (2001-2007)." United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan. September 1st, 2007.

http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/_UN-Docs/UNAMA%20-%20SUICIDE%20ATTACKS%20STUDY%20-%20SEPT%209th%202007.pdf 89.

And "Afghanistan frees 14-year old boy trained as suicide bomber at madrassa in Pakistan." *International Herald Tribunes*. The Associated Press. Sunday 15, 2007.

⁷⁰ Zavis, Alexandra. "Iraqi Militants Feed on Corruption." *Los Angeles Times*. October 26, 2007.

⁷¹ Motlagh, Jason. "Analysis: Taliban Upgrade Jihad Strategy."

⁷² Ricks, Thomas E. and Karen DeYoung. "Al-Qaeda in Iraq Reported Crippled." *Washington Post*. Oct 14, 2007. A01.